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1  Introduction 
 
The exclusion of unconstitutionally obtained evidence in criminal trials is a subject 
that frequently evokes a conflict between two equally important societal views. Crime 
control protagonists are repulsed by the acquittal of those who are factually guilty. 
They contend that society pays an excessive price when an accused is acquitted for 
the reason that unconstitutionally obtained evidence, crucial for a conviction on a 
serious charge, has been excluded. The social costs of exclusion are great under 
these circumstances, because a person who is factually guilty has not been brought 
to book. By contrast, fundamental rights advocates frown upon a conviction based 
on  evidence  procured  by  police  conduct  that  unlawfully  encroaches  upon  the 
constitutional rights of accused persons. In other words, there is a tension between 
the  truth-seeking  function  of  the  criminal  justice  system  and  the  protection  of 
fundamental rights. The South African exclusionary rule was designed to strike a 
balance between these countervailing societal interests.  
 
In terms of South African common law courts were, after Ex Parte Minister of Justice 
in re R v Matemba,
1 except for admissions,
2 confessions,
3 and pointings-out,
4 not 
                                                           
  This  contribution  is  based  on  research  undertaken  by  the  author  in  partial  fulfilment  of  the 
requirements for the LLD degree at the Faculty of Law, University of Pretoria. This contribution is 
partially based on a paper delivered at the Indaba on Criminal Procedure and Evidence held on 
29 July 2011 at the North-West University, Potchefstroom. The financial assistance provided by 
the NRF and the FRIC of the Tshwane University of Technology is gratefully acknowledged. I 
wish to thank the anonymous peer reviewers for their valuable comments on a previous draft. 
  Dane  Ally.  BA  (Law)  B  Proc  LLM  LLD.  Senior  Lecturer,  Department  of  Law,  Faculty  of 
Humanities, Tshwane University of Technology.  Email: AllyD@tut.ac.za. 
1   Ex Parte Minister of Justice in re R v Matemba 1941 AD 75. In this case the admissibility of a 
palm print, taken against the will of the accused, was at issue. The Appellate Division of the 
Supreme  Court  held  the  evidence  to  be  admissible,  as  the  police  conduct  did  not  result  in 
testimonial compulsion. 
2   See s 219A Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 (as amended) (hereafter the CPA). D ALLY                                                                                           PER / PELJ 2012(15)5 
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especially concerned with the manner in which evidence had been obtained.
5 The 
rationale for the existence of the exceptions relevant to admissions, confessions and 
pointings-out  is  in  the  main  a  lack  of  voluntariness,
6  as  well  as  the  reliability 
principle.
7 The golden rule that applied was whether  or not  the evidence obtained 
was relevant to the issues and, if the answer was in the affirmative , such evidence 
would  in  general  be  admissible.  The  incorporation  of  s ection  35(5)  into  the 
Constitution  of  the  Republic  of  South  Africa,  1996
8  significantly  changed  this 
position. This provision reads as follows: 
 
Evidence obtained in a manner that violates any right contained in the Bill of Rights 
must be excluded if the admission of such evidence would render the trial unfair or 
otherwise be detrimental to the administration of justice. 
 
This provision suggests that evidence may be excluded (despite its relevance to the 
issues) if it was obtained as a result of an infringement of a right guaranteed in the 
Bill of Rights, and if its admission would cause either of the consequences that this 
provision seeks to prevent. Naudé
9 is of the opinion that the courts of South Africa 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
3   The admissibility of confessions is governed by s 217 of the CPA.  
4   See for example S v Nzama 2009 2 SACR 326 (KZP), where the admissibility of a pointing-out 
was in contention recently. For a discussion of the concepts of admissions, confessions and 
pointings-out, see Schwikkard 1991 SACJ 326; Du Toit et al Commentary 24-66I, 24-66N to 24-
66Q; also Kruger and Kriegler Suid-Afrikaanse Strafproses 621-624.  
5   See S v Matlou 2010 2 SACR 342 (SCA) para 27; also Zeffertt and Paizes Law of Evidence 630; 
De Villiers (ed) TRC Report 191 sets out police practice in obtaining admissions and confessions 
in South Africa during that period as follows: "Numerous applicants [police officers] admitted that 
psychological and physical coercion was routinely used in both legal detentions and unlawful 
custody"; and at 619 the report concludes as follows: "It is accepted now that detention without 
trial  allowed  for  the  abuse  of  those  held  in  custody,  that  torture  and  maltreatment  were 
widespread and that, whilst officials of the former state were aware of what was happening, they 
did nothing about it." See also De Vos 2011 TSAR 269. 
6   See S v Januarie 1991 2 SACR 682 (SE); S v Sheehama 1991 2 SACR 860 (A) and S v Agnew 
1996 2 SACR 535 (C) 538. The admissibility of admissions, confessions and pointings-out are 
subject to technical requirements developed by the courts in their interpretation of the relevant 
sections, with the aim of creating procedural safeguards for the protection of the accused. For a 
discussion of the requirements for the admissibility of admissions, confessions and pointings-out, 
see  Du  Toit  et  al  Commentary  24-50J  to  24-82;  also  Kruger  and  Kriegler  Suid-Afrikaanse 
Strafproses 541-568. For the legal position in England on this issue, see s 76(5) of the Police 
and Criminal Evidence Act 1986, as well as the matter of Lam Chi-ming v R 1991 LRC (Crim) 
416 422. 
7   S v Matlou 2010 2 SACR 342 para 27; also Schwikkard 1991 SACJ 321-323. 
8   Henceforth referred to as the Constitution. 
9   Naudé 2009 Obiter 627. The opinion has been expressed before that the Grant admissibility 
framework is in essence an assessment of the factors analysed during the era of R v Collins 
1987 1 SCR 265 (SCC), but in different contexts – see Ally 2010 SALJ 710. The following remark 
by  Cromwell  J,  made  on  behalf  of  the  majority  opinion  in  R  v  Côte  2011  SCC  46  para  46, 
confirms the correctness of this point of view: "In setting out this new framework, this Court made D ALLY                                                                                           PER / PELJ 2012(15)5 
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should  follow  the  Canadian  admissibility  framework  recently  adopted  by  the 
Supreme  Court  of  Canada  in  R  v  Grant
10  to  assess  the  admissibility  of 
unconstitutionally obtained evidence. By contrast, De Vos
11 is of the view that such 
an approach is not aligned to the structure of section 35(5). The latter point of view is 
supported. It is submitted that the admissibility assessment  should consist of two 
tests  that  must  be  clearly  separated  from  each  other  for  the  reason  that  the 
assessment  in  each  leg  of  the  analysis  serves  to  enhance  different  societal 
interests.
12 The discussion in this contribution is accordingly based  upon this two-
legged approach, as opposed to  that followed in the current Canadian admissibility 
framework.
13 It must, however, be emphasised that section 24(2) Canadian Charter 
jurisprudence remains a valuable source for the interpretation of section 35(5). 
 
Endorsing the approach adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada in the seminal 
decision of R v Collins,
14 the majority opinion of the  Supreme Court of Appeal in 
Pillay v S
15 reasoned that three groups of factors must be considered in order to 
assess whether the disputed evidence should be either received or excluded.
16 The 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
it clear that while these lines of inquiry did not precisely track the categories of considerations set 
out in earlier jurisprudence, they did capture the factors relevant to the s. 24(2) determination that 
had been set out in earlier cases. In Beaulieu, Charron J., writing for the Court, emphasized this 
point, and noted that Grant did not change the relevant factors in the s. 24(2) analysis". Compare 
the comment by the distinguished Canadian scholar, Stuart 2010 Sw J Int'l L 313, where he 
expresses the following view: "Much of the voluminous jurisprudence on section 24(2) over the 
past 27 years will be of little significance". I do, however, support Stuart's view that immediately 
follows  the  quoted  sentence:  "The  Court  has  arrived  at  a  revised  discretionary  approach  to 
section  24(2)  free  of  rigid  rules,  instead  placing  special  emphasis  on  the  seriousness  of  the 
breach rather than the seriousness of the offence or the reliability of the evidence. In my view, 
the  Court  has  adopted  a  more  sensible,  carefully  balanced  and  distinctive  approach  to  the 
exclusion of unconstitutionally obtained evidence ..." – see Ally 2010 SALJ 712. One of the major 
departures from the Collins era is the fact that the conscripted/non-conscripted distinction has 
been discarded. 
10   R v Grant 2009 66 CR (6th) 1 (SCC). 
11   De Vos 2011 TSAR 268. 
12   This approach should arguably be followed because of the textual differences between s 24(2) of 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 1982 (henceforth "the Canadian Charter" or "the 
Charter") and s 35(5). Unlike the Canadian provision, which clearly sets out one criterion for the 
admissibility  assessment,  s  35(5)  directs  that  South  Africa's  courts  should  determine  firstly  if 
admission of the evidence would render the trial unfair; and secondly what effect the exclusion or 
admission of the evidence would have on the integrity of the criminal justice system. In other 
words, the courts must demonstrate what effect the admission of the evidence would have on the 
fairness of the trial, whereas the Canadian courts are not bound by such a directive. See in this 
regard the comparable point of view held by De Vos 2011 TSAR 274. 
13   See, in this regard, Ally 2010 SALJ 713. 
14   R v Collins 1987 1 SCR 265 (SCC). 
15   Pillay v S 2004 2 BCLR 158 (SCA). 
16   Pillay v S 2004 2 BCLR 158 (SCA) paras 87 and 93. D ALLY                                                                                           PER / PELJ 2012(15)5 
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first  group  of  factors  (trial  fairness)  is  considered  during  the  first  leg  of  the 
admissibility  assessment.
17  The first leg of the assessment relates to the phrase 
"[e]vidence … must be excluded if its admission would render the trial unfair". This 
assessment is concerned with the effect that admission of the disputed evidence 
would have on the fairness of the trial. During the first leg of the assessment the 
public interest in protecting the rights of the accused is the key concern.
18 This leg of 
the admissibility assessment is not explored in this article.
19 
 
The  second  leg  of  the  admissibility  analysis  relates  to  the  phrase  "would  be 
detrimental to the administration of justice".
20 The second and third groups of factors 
are evaluated during this leg of the admissibility assessment.
21 The second group of 
factors is concerned with the seriousness of the constitutional infringement,
22 and the 
third group of factors deals with the effect that exclusion may have on the integrity of 
the administration of justice.
23 In this contribution, I explore the third group of factors 
(also known as the "effect of exclusion on the integrity of the criminal justice system" 
or an assessment of the "costs of exclusion"). In doing so I wish to join a number of 
South  African  commentators  who  have  already  made  meaningful  contributions 
towards the interpretation of section 35(5) of the Constitution.
24  
                                                           
17   Pillay v S 2004 2 BCLR 158 (SCA) paras 87-90.  
18   Ally 2010 SALJ 713. 
19   For a discussion of the first leg of the admissibility assessment, see Schmidt and Rademeyer 
Bewysreg 378; Van der Merwe "Unconstitutionally obtained evidence" (2009) 224-248, and the 
unpublished doctoral thesis by Ally Constitutional Exclusion 210-358. 
20   See Van der Merwe "Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence" (2009) 248. 
21   Pillay v S 2004 2 BCLR 158 (SCA) para 91, where the majority opinion introduced this leg of the 
assessment as follows: "This brings us to the second leg of the enquiry ..." 
22   For a discussion of the second group of factors, see Van der Merwe "Unconstitutionally Obtained 
Evidence" (2009) 248-259; Schmidt and Rademeyer Bewysreg 381-382. 
23   Pillay v S 2004 2 BCLR 158 (SCA) para 97, where Mpati DP and Motata AJA wrote the majority 
opinion and held as follows: "Lamer J, in the Collins case (at 138), says the question under 
section 24(2) of the Charter is whether the system's repute will be better served by the admission 
or the exclusion of the evidence. Our view is that the same applies under section 35(5) of the 
Constitution". 
24   See  for  example  the  significant  contribution  made  by  Van  der  Merwe  "Unconstitutionally 
Obtained Evidence" (2009) 181-259, and his contribution in Du Toit et al Commentary 24-98H to 
24-9N-12. See also Steytler Constitutional Criminal Procedure 33-40; Schwikkard "Evidence" 52-
57  to  52-64;  Schwikkard  "Arrested,  Detained  and  Accused  Persons"  737-797;  Naudé  2009 
SAPR/PL 506; Naudé 2001 SACJ 38-58; Schwikkard 1997 SAJHR 446-457; Zeffertt and Paizes 
Law of Evidence 625-641; Schutte 2000 SACJ 318-57-68; Ally 2010 SACJ 22; Ally 2010 CILSA 
239; De Villiers 1997 TSAR 615; De Villiers 1998 TSAR 20. D ALLY                                                                                           PER / PELJ 2012(15)5 
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As said before, based on R v Collins,
25 the relevant factors considered under the 
third group of factors are the "seriousness of the charges faced by the accused" and 
the  "importance of the evidence to secure a conviction ".  An important issue that 
arises when this group of factors is  considered is if the reliability of the evidence 
(particularly real evidence) and its significance in proving factual guilt should play a 
prominent role in the assessment. Given that the third group of factors is concerned 
with the public interest in crime control, it  has been suggested that public opinion 
should be a weighty factor when th is group of factors is considered.
26 It is against 
this background that this contribution poses the following three questions: firstly, if 
the "current mood" of society should be accorded much weight  when this group of 
factors  is  weighed  and  balanced  against  the  other  relevant  factors  during  the 
admissibility assessment; secondly,  if  a consideration of the  "seriousness of the 
charge" and "the importance of the evidence to secure a conviction " could possibly 
encroach upon the presumption of innocence;
27 and, finally, if factual guilt should be 
allowed to tilt the scales in favour of the admission of unconstitutionally obtained 
evidence if the evidence is essential for a conviction on a serious charge?  
 
It  is  important  to  note  that  an  admissibility  assessment  under  section  35(5)  is 
considered  during  a  trial -within-a-trial.
28  Nevertheless,  the  practice  has  recently 
developed that an accused may challenge the admissibility of evidence by means of 
a pre-trial motion on the grounds that a warrant authorising the search and seizure of 
evidence be declared invalid
29 or that a provision contained in an Act of Parliament, 
authorising  the  issue  and  execution  of  a  search  warrant  be  declared 
                                                           
25   R v Collins 1987 1 SCR 265 (SCC). 
26   Van der Merwe "Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence" (2009) 249. 
27   For a discussion of this issue in the Canadian context, see Ally 2010 SALJ 705-706. 
28   See S v August 2005 2 All SA 605 (NC); S v Motloutsi 1996 1 SACR 78 (C); S v Melani 1996 2 
BCLR 174 (EC); S v Mayekiso 1996 2 SACR 298 (C); S v Van der Merwe 1997 19 BCLR (O); S 
v Mathebula 1997 1 BCLR 123 (W); S v Soci 1998 2 SACR 275 (E); S v Madiba 1998 1 BCLR 38 
(D); S v Mphala 1998 1 SACR 388 (W); S v Shongwe 1998 9 BCLR 1170 (T); S v Gumede 1998 
5 BCLR 530 (D); S v Naidoo 1998 1 SACR 479 (D); S v Malefo 1998 1 SACR 127 (W); S v 
Ngcobo 1998 10 BCLR 1248 (N); S v Muravha 1998 JOL 3994 (V); S v Cloete 1999 2 SACR 137 
(C); S v Hoho 1999 2 SACR 159 (C); S v R 2000 1 SACR 33 (W); S v Ndlovu 2001 1 SACR 85 
(W); S v Mashumpa 2008 1 SACR 128 (E); S v Nell 2009 2 SACR 37 (C); S v Matlou 2010 2 
SACR 342 (SCA); S v Dos Santos 2010 2 SACR 382 (SCA); S v Lachman 2010 2 SACR 52 
(SCA); S v Mkhize 2011 1 SACR 554 (KZD). See also Schmidt and Rademeyer Bewysreg 382; 
Du Toit et al Commentary 24-66D to 24-66J. 
29   See  Bennett  v  Minster  of  Safety  and  Security  2006  1  SACR  523  (T);  Mahomed  v  National 
Director  of  Safety  and  Security  2006  1  SACR  495  (W);  Zuma  v  National  Director  of  Public 
Prosecutions 2006 1 SACR 468 (D). D ALLY                                                                                           PER / PELJ 2012(15)5 
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unconstitutional.
30 However, in the decision of Thint (Pty) Ltd v National Director of 
Public  Prosecutions;  Zuma  v  National  Director  of  Public  Prosecutions,
31  the 
Constitutional Court discouraged the  application of this pre-trial remedy when it is 
aimed exclusively at circumventing the application of section 35(5) or at delaying the 
finalisation of criminal proceedings. 
 
It must be emphasised that although the focus in this contribution is centred on the 
third group of factors, it must  be borne in mind that the section 35(5) assessment 
consists of a balancing exercise, where this group of factors should be weighed and 
balanced against other relevant factors before a court may decide whether either  to 
admit or to exclude the disputed evidence.
32 
 
This article is presented in three parts. The introduction (part 1) is followed by a 
discussion of the effect of exclusion on the integrity of criminal justice (also known as 
the third group of  Collins factors) in part two.  The discussion in part two is sub-
divided into three parts. It starts off by asking if the "current mood" of society should 
play a role in the admissibility assessment and, if so, should considerable weight be 
attached to it? Secondly, the "seriousness of the charge faced by the accused" is 
discussed,  and  thirdly,  the  "importance  of  the  evidence  in  order  to  secure  a 
conviction" is explored. This is followed by a short conclusion in part three, where a 
recommendation is made in regard to the assessment of the third group of factors. 
2  The effect of exclusion on the integrity of the criminal justice system 
(the social costs of exclusion) 
 
                                                           
30   Maghjane v Chairperson, North-West Gambling Board 2006 2 SACR 447 (CC). 
31   Thint (Pty) Ltd v National Director of Public Prosecutions; Zuma v National Director of Public 
Prosecutions 2008 ZACC 13 par 65; compare S v Basson 2007 1 SACR 566 (CC) para 262, 
where the Constitutional Court dismissed (in a different context) an application based on the 
contention that the issue of the admissibility of bail proceedings should not have been heard 
before the accused had been called upon to plead. 
32   For a discussion of this balancing exercise, see Ally 2010 SALJ 712-723. However, compare the 
approach followed in S v Mkhize 2011 1 SACR 554 (KZD) para 51, where Govindasamy AJ 
applied an approach based on the "automatic" exclusion of unconstitutionally obtained evidence 
when he reasoned as follows: "I am in agreement with the learned Patel J in Viljoen's case: there 
is no discretion afforded to a judicial officer when he/she is confronted with a situation where 
evidence is obtained unconstitutionally. To admit such evidence, contaminated as it is, will be a 
violation of the accused's rights, and, above all, will be prejudicial to the administration of justice." D ALLY                                                                                           PER / PELJ 2012(15)5 
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Should  public  opinion  play  a  role  in  determining  whether  the  exclusion  or  the 
admission of the disputed evidence could result in "detriment" to the administration 
of justice? If so, what weight should be attached to it? These issues are addressed 
below. 
 
2.1  The "current public mood" of society or public opinion
33 
 
The Constitutional Court was called upon in  S v Makwanyane
34 to determine the 
relevance and weight to be attached to public opinion when interpreting the Bill of 
Rights. Chaskalson P held that public opinion does play a role when interpreting the 
Constitution, but courts should not be slaves to it.
35 In his often-quoted statement on 
this issue, Chaskalson P was prepared to assume that the majority of South Africans 
are in favour of the retention of the death penalty, and continued by demarcating the 
impact of public opinion when interpreting a constitutional provision as follows:
36 
 
Public  opinion  may  have  some  relevance  to  the  enquiry,  but  in  itself,  it  is  no 
substitute  for  the  duty  vested  in  the  Courts  to  interpret  the  Constitution  and  to 
uphold its provisions without fear or favour. If public opinion were to be decisive 
there would be no need for constitutional adjudication. The protection of rights could 
then be left to Parliament, which has a mandate from the public, and is answerable 
to the public for the way its mandate is exercised, but this would be a return to 
parliamentary sovereignty, and a retreat from the new legal order established by the 
1993 Constitution. 
 
It should be emphasised that Chaskalson P discussed the task of public opinion not 
only in relation to the constitutionality of the death penalty, but also with the intention 
of providing guidance with regard to the interpretation of the provisions of the Bill of 
Rights. To state the obvious, section 35(5) forms an integral part of the Bill of Rights. 
It follows that this pronouncement by Chaskalson P should apply with equal force to 
the interpretation of section 35(5). Differently put, section 35(5) should be regarded 
not  only  as  a  constitutional  remedy,  but  it  should  also  be  considered  as  a 
fundamental right and should be interpreted accordingly. 
                                                           
33   For a discussion of the Canadian position see Ally 2010 SALJ 699-670, where the relevance of 
the Canadian approach to the interpretation of s 35(5) in general, and the significance of the 
Canadian approach to this aspect of our exclusionary rule in particular are explored. 
34   S v Makwanyane 1995 2 SACR 1 (CC). 
35   S v Makwanyane 1995 2 SACR 1 (CC) para 88. 
36   S v Makwanyane 1995 2 SACR 1 (CC) para 88. D ALLY                                                                                           PER / PELJ 2012(15)5 
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In striking contrast to the approach adopted by Chaskalson P in S v Makwanyane,
37 
Scott JA, writing a dissenting minority opinion in Pillay v S,
38 referred to the caveat 
issued  by  Chaskalson  P  in  the  former  decision,  but  distinguished  the  approach 
followed by Chaskalson P from the interpretation of section 35(5), and reasoned as 
follows:
39 
 
It  seems to  me,  however, that the  very  nature  of  the  second  leg  of  the  inquiry 
postulated in section 35(5) of the Constitution contemplates a reference to public 
opinion. It must, at least, therefore constitute an important element of the inquiry.  
 
Scott  JA  reasoned  that  public  opinion  is  a  relevant  factor  in  the  admissibility 
assessment and that it should be accorded significant weight when the courts have 
to consider whether the admission or exclusion of the disputed evidence would be 
"detrimental to the administration of justice". Van der Merwe echoes this point of 
view when he argues that the phrase "would be detrimental to the administration of 
justice"  is  indicative  of  the  fact  that  public  opinion  should  be  a  prominent 
consideration  when  the  third  group  of  factors  is  assessed.
40  This  argument  is 
vulnerable to criticism. Even though the concept of "detriment" involves the making 
of a value judgment determined by a presiding officer while taking into account the 
contemporary views of the public at large, this assessment should not be equated 
with a consideration of public opinion. Langa  DP in S v Williams
41 emphasised the 
importance of this distinction when he indicated that the South African Constitution is 
different from that of the United States. The President of the Constitutional Court 
held that South African courts should interpret the Constitution in accordance with 
the "values that underlie an open and democratic society based on [human dignity], 
                                                           
37   S v Makwanyane 1995 2 SACR 1 (CC) para 88. 
38   Pillay v S 2004 2 BCLR 158 (SCA). 
39   Pillay v S 2004 2 BCLR 158 (SCA) para 126.  Emphasis added. 
40   Van der Merwe "Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence" (2002) 234. He contends the following: "It 
is  submitted  that  the  courts  are  …  fully  entitled  to  lean  in  favour  of  crime  control.  …  [I]t  is 
probably true that public opinion – including public acceptance of a verdict and support for the 
system – must go into the scale as a weighty factor". (Emphasis added). See also De Vos 2011 
TSAR 278. 
41   S v Williams 1995 7 BCLR 861 (CC). Langa DP was the Deputy President of the Constitutional 
Court when this judgment was delivered. D ALLY                                                                                           PER / PELJ 2012(15)5 
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freedom and equality", instead of "contemporary standards of decency".
42 In the light 
hereof, it is noteworthy that Langa DP intended to impress on South African courts 
that the prevailing public mood should occupy a subsidiary role in relation to the 
long-term values sought to be achieved by the Constitution.
43 
 
It is suggested that the approach to the interpretation of the provisions of the Bi ll of 
Rights (chapter 2 of the  Constitution) should – depending on the rationale and the 
text  of  its  constituent  provisions  –  as  far  as  possible  be  in  accordance  with  its 
broader  purposes.
44  Put in another way , for  the benefit of  coherence and  legal 
certainty there should sensibly be a consistent approach to the interpretation of the 
provisions of the Bill of Rights. Within this context, South African courts should, when 
determining whether to exclude or admit unconstitutionally obtained evidence  under 
section  35(5),  take  note  of  the  reminder  provided  by  Chaskalson  P  in  S  v 
Makwanyane.
45 This is especially important when one takes into account that the 
Makwanyane  court  was  called  upon  to  provide  a  remedy  for  the  vindication  of 
constitutional  guarantees  –  section  35(5)  serves  the  equivalent  purpose.  It  is 
accordingly submitted that South African courts should take note of public opinion 
when  applying  section  35(5),  without  seeking  public  popularity.  Erasmus  J  is  in 
favour  of  such  an  approach,  as  expounded  by  him  in  the  decisions  of  S  v 
                                                           
42   S  v  Williams  1995  7  BCLR  861  (CC)  para  36-37.  The  judge  intimated  that  the  relationship 
between "contemporary standards of decency" and public opinion is uncertain, but added that he 
is unconvinced that they are synonymous. It should be stated that the concept of "human dignity" 
was not included as a constitutional value in the Interim Constitution. This constitutional value is 
included in the 1996 Constitution.  
43   Van der Merwe "Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence" (2009) 250, is of the view that the over-
emphasis on the "longer term constitutional values may result in a fairly rigid exclusionary rule – 
a result that the drafters of s 35(5) clearly wished to avoid". However, he correctly explains the 
predicament the courts would be faced with if public opinion were to be over-emphasised, in the 
following terms: "… over-emphasis of public opinion would result in a wide inclusionary approach 
– an approach which is … incompatible with a constitutional due process system". 
44   See the approach followed by the European Court of Human Rights in Klass v Germany 1961, 
Series A No 28 para 68, where it was held that the interpretation of a provision of the European 
Convention must be "in harmony with the logic of the  Convention"; see further the Canadian 
approach  in  R  v  Big  M  Drug  Mart  Ltd  1985  50  CCC  (3d)  1  (SCC)  which  was  followed  by 
Chaskalson P in S v Makwanyane 1995 2 SACR 1 (CC) para 88. 
45   S v Makwanyane 1995 2 SACR 1 (CC). Currie and De Waal (eds) Bill of Rights Handbook 10 
describe  this  attribute  of  the  Constitution  in  the  following  terms:  "The  new  Constitution  is  a 
democratic pre-commitment to a government that is constrained by certain rules, including the 
rule that a decision of the majority may not violate the fundamental rights of an individual". See 
also  Moseneke  2012  SALJ  17,  where  he  reasons  that  a  "tension  clearly  exists  between 
democratic theory and constitutional supremacy. This is not a dilemma peculiar to our shores. It 
is perhaps endemic to all constitutional democracies". D ALLY                                                                                           PER / PELJ 2012(15)5 
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Nomwebu
46  and  S  v  Soci.
47  He  notes  that  public  opinion  is  influenced  by  the 
seriousness of the violation
48 and the seriousness of the charges,
49 especially when 
one has regard to the state of  "lawlessness" prevailing in South Africa.
50 He also 
refers to the comments by Van der Merwe, where the latter correctly argues that the 
public might have a negative perception of the criminal justice system in the event 
that it is perceived as acquitting a dangerous criminal because of an infringeme nt 
that could be classified as an insignificant technicality.
51 Erasmus J further cautions 
that it is dangerous to ignore such public perceptions. Moreover, the judge reasoned, 
a consideration of the "prevailing public mood"
52 provides a measure of flexibility to 
the application of the Bill of Rights and public acceptability of the values enshrined in 
the Constitution. Even so, the judge positioned the relevance of public opinion within 
its proper scope in section 35(5) challenges:
 53 
 
Not that a court will allow public opinion to dictate its decision (S v Makwanyane 
and Another 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at 431C-F). The court should in fact endeavour 
to educate the public to accept that a fair trial means a constitutional trial, and vice 
versa. … It is therefore the duty of the courts in their everyday activity to carry the 
message  to  the  public  that  the  Constitution  is  not  a  set  of  high-minded  values 
designed to protect criminals from their just deserts; but is in fact a shield which 
protects all citizens from official abuse. They must understand that for the courts to 
tolerate invasion of the rights of even the most heinous criminal would diminish their 
constitutional rights. In other words, the courts should not merely have regard to 
public opinion, but should mould people's thinking to accept constitutional norms 
using plain language understandable to the common man. 
 
The  approach  of  Erasmus  J  complements  the  dictum  of  Chaskalson  P  in  S  v 
Makwanyane,
54  while  at  the  same  time  it  is  har monious  with  the  approach  of  
Canadian counterparts as reflected in the decisions of R v Collins,
55 R v Jacoy
56 and 
                                                           
46   S v Nomwebu 1996 2 SACR 396 (E). 
47   S v Soci 1998 2 SACR 275 (E). 
48   The second group of factors. 
49   The third group of factors. 
50   S v Nomwebu 1996 2 SACR 396 (E) 648a-c; S v Soci 1998 2 SACR 275 (E) 295. 
51   S v Nomwebu 1996 2 SACR 396 (E) 648a-c. This was also of concern to the full bench in S v 
Desai 1997 1 All SA 298 (W) 42b-f. See also Meintjies-Van der Walt 1996 SACJ 89. 
52   S v Nomwebu 1996 2 SACR 396 (E) 648. Compare the Canadian approach followed in  R v 
Collins  1987  1  SCR  265  (SCC)  to  the  effect  that  the  current  mood  of  the  public  should  be 
considered, only if it is reasonable. 
53   S  v  Nomwebu  1996  2  SACR  396  (E)  648d-f  and  S  v  Soci  1998  2  SACR  275  (E)  295-296 
(Emphasis in original). 
54   S v Makwanyane 1995 2 SACR 1 (CC) para 88. 
55   R v Collins 1987 1 SCR 265 (SCC). 
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R  v  Feeney.
57  Moreover,  the  South  African  courts  and  commentat ors  have 
expressed the view that the provisions contained in section 35(5) and section 24(2) 
of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms are remarkably similar.
58 For these 
reasons, it is suggested that the dictum of Erasmus J accurately sets out the scope 
and function of public opinion in section 35(5) challenges. Of great value for South 
African section 35(5) jurisprudence is the  remark by Erasmus J that admissibility 
rulings should not be premised on public opinion.  
 
Furthermore, there appears to be no convincing reason why the prudent approach 
adopted by Lamer J, in R v Collins,
59 to the effect that the courts are customarily the 
only  "effective shelter for individuals and unpopular minorities ",
60  should not be 
applicable to South African courts
61 when "detriment to the administration of justice" 
has to be determined  under  section 35(5). The provisions of section 35 (5)  were 
introduced into the Bill of Rights in order to protect persons accused of having 
allegedly committed a crime from the power of the majority.  In the light hereof, the 
protection granted by section 35(5) should not be left to the majority, from which the 
accused needs protection.
62 No doubt the accused, when faced with the might of the 
prosecuting authority – with all its expertise and resources, representing the people 
of South Africa – represents a vulnerable minority. By showing a preparedness to 
protect the constitutional rights of the accused South African courts will instil public 
confidence in the criminal justice system. Unwillingness to do so may produce the 
                                                           
57   R v Feeney 1997 115 CCC (3d) 129 (SCC). 
58   See for example Pillay v S 2004 2 BCLR 158 (SCA) para 91 and S v Tandwa 2008 1 SACR para 
122;  also  Ally  2010  SALJ  695  where  reference  is  made  inter  alia  to  Van  der  Merwe 
"Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence" (2009) 214 and Viljoen "Law of Criminal Procedure and 
the Bill of Rights" 5B-50. See further De Vos 2011 TSAR 271. 
59   R v Collins 1987 1 SCR 265 (SCC). 
60   R v Collins 1987 1 SCR 265 (SCC) para 34. 
61   In this regard, see the approach followed by Chaskalson P in S v Makwanyane 1995 2 SACR 1 
(CC) dealing with the constitutionality of the death penalty. See also S v Melani 1996 2 BCLR 
174 (EC) 352, where Froneman J concluded that: "It is true that courts should hold themselves 
accountable to the public, but that does not mean that they should seek public popularity"; also 
Moseneke  2012  SALJ  18;  compare  Van  der  Merwe  "Unconstitutionally  Obtained  Evidence" 
(2002) 324. 
62   See in this regard the comments by Chaskalson P in S v Makwanyane 1995 2 SACR 1 (CC) 
para 88, where he reasoned that: "The very reason for establishing the new legal order, and for 
vesting the power of judicial review of all legislation in the courts, was to protect the rights of 
minorities and others who cannot protect their rights adequately through the democratic process. 
Those entitled to claim this protection include the social outcasts and marginalized people of our 
society. It is only if there is a willingness to protect the worst and the weakest amongst us, that all 
of us can be secure that our own rights will be protected".  D ALLY                                                                                           PER / PELJ 2012(15)5 
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opposite  result,  which  would  be  detrimental  to  the  administration  of  justice.  This 
argument  is  further  fortified  by  the  supremacy  clause,
63  which dictates that the 
Constitution shall be the supreme law in South Africa. Consequently, in the event 
that  public  opinion  is  in  conflict  with  the  provisions  and  objectives  sought  to  be 
advanced by the Constitution, the latter must surely prevail.
64  
 
Additionally, the undue emphasis on public opinion during the assessment of the 
third group of factors may disturb the  very nature of the section 35(5) discretion. It 
could provide judges with the latitude to determine the admissibility issue based on 
their subjective views of the  "current mood" of society. In such circumstances the 
possibility remains that the purposes sought to be achieved by section 35(5) might 
be hindered.
65 Ostensibly with the aim  of preventing the personal perspectives of 
judges  from  interfering  with their section 35(5) assessments, the  decision in  R v 
Collins
66 informs that judicial officers should refer to what they conceive to be the 
views  of  society  at  large,  bearing  in  mind  that  they  do  not  have  an  unfettered 
discretion: A presiding officer should constantly remind herself or himself that
67 
 
… his [or her] discretion is grounded in community values. He [or she] should not 
render  a  decision  that  would  be  unacceptable  to  the  community  when  the 
community is not being wrought in passion or otherwise under passing stress due to 
current events. 
 
This dictum of Lamer J in R v Collins
68 clearly indicates that public attitudes towards 
exclusion or admission do matter
69 when a court determines the second leg of the 
                                                           
63   Section 2 of the Constitution. 
64   Kentridge and Spitz "Interpretation" 11-16A, where they argue that: "The effect of the supremacy 
clause is to assign to the courts a role  which  extends beyond  interpreting and enforcing the 
majority will, to the protection of the fundamental rights of individuals and minorities". 
65   See for example the approach in S v Shongwe 1998 9 BCLR 1170 (T). 
66   R v Collins 1987 1 SCR 265 (SCC). 
67   R v Collins 1987 1 SCR 265 (SCC) para 34. See also S v Melani 1996 2 BCLR 174 (EC) 352, 
where this dictum was quoted with approval. 
68   R v Collins 1987 1 SCR 265 (SCC) para 34. 
69   The South African High Court adopted this approach. See, for example, S v Melani 1996 2 BCLR 
174  (EC)  297,  where  the  court  dealt  with  the  function  of  public  opinion  and  its  role  in  the 
admissibility assessment when the charges are of a serious nature, as follows: "At the time of 
delivery of this judgment it is, I think, fair to say that there is a widespread public perception that 
crime is on the increase … I venture to suggest that a public opinion poll would probably show 
that a majority of our population would at this stage of the history of our country be quite content 
if  the  courts  allow  evidence  at  a  criminal  trial,  even  if  it  was  unconstitutionally  obtained". 
Furthermore, Froneman J, in S v Melani 1996 2 BCLR 174 (EC) 352, was mindful of the fact that 
the "current public mood" of the public towards unconstitutionally obtained evidence favoured the D ALLY                                                                                           PER / PELJ 2012(15)5 
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admissibility  inquiry,  provided  that  the  "current  mood"  of  society  could  not  be 
characterised  as  unreasonable.
70  What  could  be  categorised  as  unreasonable 
should not be left to the all -encompassing discretion of the presiding officer.
71  A 
presiding officer should always be mindful of the fact that he or she is interpreting a 
constitutional provision and his or her  decision should therefore demonstrate that 
due regard has been given to the values that underpin the Constitution.
72  
 
More importantly, an over-emphasis on public opinion would necessarily imply that a 
consideration of the long-term effect that the regular admission of unconstitutionally 
obtained  evidence  would  have  on  the  integrity  of  the  justice  system  would  be 
relegated to an insignificant concern, especially when the evidence was important for 
a conviction on a serious charge.  
 
In what follows, attention is paid to  two factors which comprise the third group of 
factors. As stated before, these factors are the "seriousness of the charge" and the 
"importance of the evidence to secure a conviction".
73  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
inclusion  of  evidence,  but  declined  to  be  bound  by  such  public  attitudes,  and  observed  as 
follows: "It is true that courts should hold themselves accountable to the public, but that does not 
mean that they should seek public popularity". 
70   See R v Collins 1987 1 SCR 265 (SCC) paras 33-34.  
71   R v Collins 1987 1 SCR 265 (SCC) paras 33-34. 
72   S v Melani 1996 2 BCLR 174 (EC) 297 and S v Nomwebu 1996 2 SACR 396 (E) 648d-f. 
73   In this regard the view of Stuart 2010 Sw J Int'l L 326 is of great importance: "... while reliability of 
evidence and whether the evidence is essential to the Crown's case are relevant considerations, 
they  do  not  trump"  during  the  balancing  exercise  that  must  be  performed  when  our  courts 
determine whether unconstitutionally obtained evidence should either be admitted or excluded. D ALLY                                                                                           PER / PELJ 2012(15)5 
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2.2  The seriousness of the charge
74 
All open and democratic societies have, over the years, adopted norms that serve 
the  purpose  of  categorising  crimes  according  to  the  severity  of  their  impact  on 
society.
75 The seriousness of the charge is primarily determined by the punishment a 
court may impose.
76 Mahoney
77 suggests that the seriousness of the charge should 
not  only  be  considered  based  on  objective  norms,  but  that  any  aggravating 
circumstances of a particular case, regardless of the offence charged, should be 
taken into account. A court may furthermore determine the seriousness of the charge 
faced by the accused by considering facts that are not in dispute in the main trial,
78 
facts in the trial-within-trial,
79 and the allegations contained in the charge sheet.
80  
 
It should be emphasised that   due regard should be had ,  when considering this 
factor, to the presumption of innocence and the values sought to be protected by this 
constitutionally  entrenched  right.  The  Constitutional  Court  has  typified  the 
presumption of innocence as  "fundamental to our concepts of justice and forensic 
fairness".
81 What should therefore be assessed under this group of factors should be 
the  seriousness  of  the  offence  charged  and  not  the  seriousness  of  the  crime 
committed.
82  
 
                                                           
74   Ally 2010 SALJ 704-705 discusses the Canadian approach to this group of factors.  The courts of 
Canada have been reluctant to apply this group of factors (the "seriousness of the charge" and 
"the importance of the evidence to secure a conviction") prior to the decision in R v Grant 2009 
66 CR (6th) 1 (SCC). In the Grant decision paras 79-84, the Supreme Court of Canada preferred 
to discuss the third group of factors under the heading "Society's interest in an adjudication on 
the merits". Three factors are considered under this line of inquiry: firstly, the reliability of the 
evidence; secondly, the importance of the evidence for the prosecution's case. However, this 
factor is relevant in a very limited sense – the exclusion of relevant, reliable evidence would have 
a  more  negative  impact  on  the  justice  system  where  the  exclusion  in  effect  destroys  the 
prosecution's case. A third factor is the seriousness of the offence. This factor is neutral: the 
failure to prosecute a serious charge may have an immediate negative effect on how society 
views  the  criminal  justice  system.  However,  the  public  must  rest  assured  that,  despite  the 
seriousness of the charge, the courts do  take rights-protection seriously. In other  words, the 
short-term public outrage at the lack of a conviction does not mean that the judge must ignore 
the long-term integrity of the justice system. 
75   Morissette 1984 McGill LJ 528. 
76   Morissette 1984 McGill LJ 529. 
77   Mahoney 1999 CLQ 461, next to fn 41 of his contribution. 
78   See S v Naidoo 1998 1 SACR 479 (D) 507-522. 
79   See S v Malefo 1998 1 SACR 127 (W) 133 and 138. 
80   S v Malefo 1998 1 SACR 127 (W) 133 and 138. 
81   S v Zuma 1995 4 BCLR 401(CC) para 36. 
82   See S v Soci 1998 2 SACR 275 (E) 297, where the importance of the presumption of innocence 
was highlighted, thus emphasising this distinction. D ALLY                                                                                           PER / PELJ 2012(15)5 
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South African courts appear to acknowledge the presumption of innocence when 
they consider this factor.
83 In S v Melani
84 the charges against the accused were 
murder, robbery, and the unlawful possession of firearms and ammunition.
85 These 
are  indisputably  serious  charges.  The  three  accused  were  conscripted  against 
themselves.
86 Froneman J observed that a public opinion poll would have suggested 
that the evidence should nevertheless be admitted, despi te the seriousness of the 
constitutional violations. However, after the judge gave due consideration to the 
presumption of innocence, the evidence was excluded.
87  Froneman J based his 
decision on "the longer term purpose of the Constitution, to establish a  democratic 
order based on, amongst others, the recognition of basic human rights ".
88 The court 
made its admissibility ruling while emphasising that it was not bound by the "current 
mood" of society. In terms of this point of view, admission or exclusion  hinges on a 
balance between the truth-seeking function of the courts and the preservation of the 
constitutional  directive  contained  in  section  35(5),  that  courts  have  a  duty  to 
safeguard the integrity of the justice system.  
 
However, the perception should not be created that the more serious the charges, 
the lesser  the protection accorded to an accused  should be. Correspondingly, the 
courts should not be more amenable to exclude evidence when the charges are 
regarded as less serious.
89 The potential harmful effect of such an approach on the 
integrity of the criminal justice system is   instantly recognisable.  It is agreed with 
Stuart who argues that the Ontario Court of Appeal erred in R v Grant
90 by adopting 
the philosophy that the more serious the offence charged, the greater the probability 
that the administration of justice will be brought into disrepute by the exclusion of 
evidence which is important to secure a conviction, because this approach implies 
                                                           
83   See S v Melani 1996 2 BCLR 174 (EC). 
84   S v Melani 1996 2 BCLR 174 (EC). 
85   S  v  Melani  1996  2  BCLR  174  (EC)  was  decided  in  terms  of  the  Interim  Constitution.  It  is 
nonetheless  submitted  that  the  Melani  court  applied  the  rationale  of  s  35(5)  when  the 
admissibility challenge was considered. This explains the relevance of this decision, despite the 
fact that judgment was delivered in terms of the Interim Constitution. 
86   Based  on  Canadian  precedent,  this  means  that  the  evidence  has  been  obtained  without 
constitutional compliance, or statutory authority, or the informed consent of the accused.  See 
Ally 2010 SALJ 697. 
87   S v Melani 1996 2 BCLR 174 (EC) 353. 
88   S v Melani 1996 2 BCLR 174 (EC) 353. 
89   This is one of the concerns raised by Canadian scholars. See Ally 2010 SALJ 705. 
90   R v Grant 2006 38 CR (6th) 58. D ALLY                                                                                           PER / PELJ 2012(15)5 
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that there should be "a de facto two-tier system where one zone is Charter-free and 
the police ends always justify the means".
91 An analogous line of  reasoning was 
applied in the Australian case of  R v Dalley,
92 where Spigelman CJ expressed the 
opinion of the court as follows: 
 
… the public interest in admitting evidence varies directly with the gravity of the 
offence. The more serious the offence, the more likely it is that the public interest 
requires the admission of the evidence. 
 
These rigid approaches suggest that the seriousness of the charges should be an 
influential factor in the admissibility assessment. In my view, this approach implies 
that  the  less  serious  the  charge faced  by  the  accused,  the  greater constitutional 
protection should be accorded to him or her. Equally, the more serious the charge, 
the  less  likely  it  is  that  the  evidence  would  be  excluded.
93  This  inflexible  line of 
reasoning  should not be determinative  of the admissibility assessment . Such an 
approach implies that an accused  may not rely on the presumption of innocence 
merely because the  prosecution  alleges that  he or  she has committed a serious 
offence. Differently put, the remedy contained in section 35(5) would be rendered 
superfluous if the accused faces a serious charge.
94 Stuart
95 highlighted the danger 
of this approach in heads of argument filed in the appeal of R v Grant.
96 In addition, 
such an approach flies in the face of the constitutional value of equal protection 
before the law and equal benefit of the law.
97 More to the point, it would offend the 
integrity of the justice system, and should primarily for this reason not be followed by 
the South African courts when this group of factors is considered.  
 
                                                           
91   Stuart Heads of Argument para 15, filed off record in the appeal of R v Grant, at the time of 
publication reported as 2009 66 CR (6th) 1 SCC. 
92   R v Dalley 2002 NSWCCA 284 para 3. 
93   See Davies 2002 CLQ 27, where he remarks that a proportionality test applied in this manner 
creates  a  "rights  paradise"  for  those  charged  with  trivial  offences,  but  alleged  rapists  and 
murderers will find themselves in "a due process desert". He highlights at 29 the fact that  a 
proportionality test runs counter to the presumption of innocence. 
94   Davies 2002 CLQ 29 highlights the fact that a proportionality test, applied in this manner, runs 
counter to the presumption of innocence. 
95   Stuart Heads of Argument. In para 15 he argues: "Without the remedy of exclusion in cases 
where the court considers the crime serious there will be a large number of criminal trials where 
the Charter will cease to provide protection". 
96   R v Grant 2009 66 CR (6th) 1 SCC. 
97   See s 9 of the Constitution. D ALLY                                                                                           PER / PELJ 2012(15)5 
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The Supreme Court of Canada recently had the opportunity to deal with this issue in 
R v Côté,
98 which arguably gives effect to the goals sought to be achieved by both 
section 24(2) of the  Canadian Charter and section 35(5) of the Constitution.  The 
court  accepted  that,  in  general,  "the  more  serious  the  offence,  the  greater  the 
likelihood that the administration of justice would be brought  into disrepute by its 
exclusion".
99 However, the court qualified this observation by adding that this factor 
has  the  "potential  to  'cut  both  ways '  and  will  not  always  weigh  in  favour  of 
admission".
100 Cromwell J,
101 reasoned as follows:
102 
 
While society has a greater interest in seeing a serious offence prosecuted, it has 
an  equivalent  interest  in  ensuring  that  the  judicial  system  is  above  reproach, 
particularly when the stakes are high. 
 
This dictum conveys the clear message that the purpose sought to be advanced by 
the exclusionary rule is ultimately a significant factor in the admissibility assessment. 
Put in another way, it would – depending on the circumstances of each case – be 
appropriate to exclude unconstitutionally obtained evidence which links the accused 
to  serious  charges  if  the  admission  of  such  evidence  would  be  harmful  to  the 
integrity  of  the  administration  of  justice.  Against  this  background,  the  approach 
followed in S v Melani
103 seems to be correct: even if the public has a crucial interest 
in a successful prosecution when the accused faces a serious charge, our courts 
should be mindful of the fact that they have been entrusted with the responsibility of 
upholding the guarantees contained in the Bill of Rights. In my view, the Bill of Rights 
has  been  designed  to  protect  the  "worst  and  the  weakest  amongst  us"  from  the 
heightened public interest in securing a conviction when an accused faces a serious 
charge.
104  Differently put,  the short-term public outcry when an accused fac ing  a 
serious charge is acqu itted  because unconstitutionally obtained evidence  that is 
                                                           
98   R v Côté 2011 SCC 46. 
99   R v Côté 2011 SCC 46 para 54. 
100  R v Côté 2011 SCC 46 para 54. 
101  McLachlin  CJ,  Binnie,  LeBel,  Fish,  Abella,  Charron,  Rothstein  JJ  concurring.  Deschamps  J 
dissenting. 
102  R v Côté 2011 SCC 46 para 54. 
103  S v Melani 1996 2 BCLR 174 (EC). 
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essential to a conviction was excluded should not be allowed to disturb the long-term 
constitutional goal of enhancing the integrity of the criminal justice system.
105  
 
2.3  The importance of the evidence for a conviction 
 
The Supreme Court of Canada indicated in R v Collins
106 that the "importance of the 
evidence to secure a conviction" should be considered under this group of factors in 
order to determine what effect the exclusion or admission of the disputed evidence 
would  have  on  the  integrity  of  the  criminal  justice  system.  This  approach  was 
endorsed by the majority judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal in Pillay v S,
107 
and  recently  applied  by  the  same  court  in  S  v  Matlou.
108  An  important  issue 
considered  here is:  should the Canadian precedent established in  R  v  Collins
109 
relating to this factor be applied by the courts of South Africa? Furthermore, is it 
possible to determine how important the evidence is for a successful prosecution 
without encroaching upon the presumption of innocence?  
 
It is in the interests of the prosecution to demonstrate that the disputed evidence is 
essential for a conviction and that it should for that reason be received by the court. 
In other words, the prosecution must present evidence that suggests that the costs 
of  exclusion  would  be  high.  Since  the  costs  of  exclusion  would  be  high  the 
prosecution would be entitled to argue that such evidence should be received rather 
than excluded because exclusion would, under the circumstances, be "detrimental" 
to the administration of justice. However, the importance of an impugned confession, 
                                                           
105  S v Melani 1996 2 BCLR 174 (EC) 353; R v Grant 2009 66 CR (6th) 1 (SCC) para 84; R v Côté 
2011 SCC 46 para 48, where this contention was raised in the following terms by the majority 
judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada, citing R v Harrison 2009 SCC 34 para 40: "… the 
seriousness  of  the  offence  and  the  reliability  of  the  evidence  should  not  be  permitted  to 
'overwhelm' the s. 24(2) analysis because this 'would deprive those charged with serious crimes 
of the protection of the individual freedoms afforded to all Canadians under the Charter and, in 
effect declare that in the administration of criminal law 'the ends justify the means' ". The Court 
continued and  underlined  that: "In  all cases, courts  must assess the  long-term repute of the 
administration of justice". This dictum was delivered in response to the judgment of the Court of 
Appeal,  where  the  latter  court  emphasised  the  seriousness  of  the  offence  and  held  that  the 
evidence must inter alia for this reason be admitted. 
106  R v Collins 1987 1 SCR 265 (SCC) paras 36-39. 
107  Pillay v S 2004 2 BCLR 158 (SCA) para 97. 
108  S v Matlou 2010 2 SACR 342 (SCA) para 32, where Bosielo JA reasoned (Leach and Cloete JJA 
concurring) that "it is clear from the proven evidence that the evidence of the pointings out by the 
first appellant and the concomitant utterances made by him were crucial to the State's case". 
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admission or pointing-out may more often than not be demonstrated solely by means 
of the contents of the disputed testimonial evidence or the disputed incriminating 
conduct and the accompanying statement. It was held in the case of S v January: 
Prokureur-Generaal, Natal v Khumalo,
110 that the disputed evidence (the contents of 
the testimonial evidence) may not be admitted until the court has made a ruling on its 
admissibility  after  a  trial -within-a-trial.  Furthermore,  the  case  of  S  v  Lebone
111 
effectively  insulates  the  presumption  of  innocence  from  encroachment  when  the 
admissibility of testimonial evidence is the subject of the admissibility dispute.  
 
The Lebone decision confirms the position in South African law that the prosecution 
may  not  lead  evidence  that  discloses  the  contents  of  the  disputed  incriminating 
testimonial evidence unless the accused challenges its admissibility on the basis that 
the  information  therein  contained  is  fabricated  or  that  it  originates  from  another 
source.
112  The prosecution may therefore not introduce evidence relating to the 
contents of  the  testimonial evidence obtained after a constitutional infringement, 
even in section  35(5) challenges, for the same reason that evidence of this nature 
was not allowed before the enactment of section 35(5).
113 As a consequence, when 
the  prosecution  is  called  upon  to  demonstrate  the  "importance of  the disputed 
evidence to secure a conviction "  –  while  the  content  of  the  disputed  testimonial 
evidence  is  the  only  source  –  the  prosecution  would  be  faced  with  the  dilemma 
presented by the Lebone and January decisions.  
 
Nevertheless, a court should, when making the section 35(5) determination - based 
on the current admissibility framework
114 - include this factor (the importance of the 
evidence for a conviction) in its assessment when it makes a value judgment
115 as to 
whether the admission or exclusion of the impugned evidence would be detrimental 
                                                           
110  S v January: Prokureur-Generaal, Natal v Khumalo 1994 2 SACR 801 (A). 
111  S v Lebone 1965 2 SA 837 (A); see also S v Khuzwayo 1990 1 SACR 365 (SCA); S v Tsotsetsi 1 
2003 2 SACR 623 (W). 
112  S v Lebone 1965 2 SA 837 (A) 841-842; S v Tsotsetsi 1 2003 2 SACR 623 (W) 627-628; see 
also Du Toit et al Commentary 24-66G and Zeffertt and Paizes Law of Evidence 566. 
113  See S v Tsotsetsi 1 2003 2 SACR 623 (W) 628. 
114  See for example the minority judgment in Pillay v S 2004 2 BCLR 158 (SCA) para 132; S v 
Shongwe 1998 2 SACR 321 (T) 344-345. 
115  S v Lottering 1999 12 BCLR 1478 (N) 1483; Pillay v S 2004 2 BCLR 158 (SCA) paras 92 and 97. 
See  also  Steytler  Constitutional  Criminal  Procedure  36;  Van  der  Merwe  "Unconstitutionally 
Obtained Evidence" (2002) 201. D ALLY                                                                                           PER / PELJ 2012(15)5 
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to the administration of justice. The difficulty in making such an assessment while 
having due regard to the presumption of innocence was pointed out by McCall J in S 
v Naidoo,
116 when the judge observed that it  "was by no means apparent at this 
stage of the trial quite how material the evidence is", but he nevertheless assumed 
its importance in view of the  vigour with which the prosecution attempted to have it 
admitted and the defence sought to have it excluded.
117 Moreover, the Januarie and 
Lebone decisions clearly dictate that a consideration of factual guilt cannot be added 
to the admissibility assessment when the prosecution relies on testimonial evidence. 
The  fact  that  an  onus  should  not  be  applied  to  determine  whether  admission  or 
exclusion  would  render  the  trial  unfair  or  otherwise  be  "detrimental"  to  the 
administration of justice
118 may not assist the prosecution if the disputed evidence is 
not sufficiently linked to the charges.
119 This problem is highlighted by the decision 
by Van Reenen J in  S v Mayekiso,
120 when the judge excluded the disputed real 
evidence, relying on the following reason:
 121 
 
Die Handves van Menseregte in Hoofstuk 3 van die Grondwet beliggaam, is juis, 
onder  andere,  daarop  gerig  om  die  individu  teen  magsmisbruik  deur 
owerheidsorgane  te  beskerm  en  'n  erodering  daarvan  behoort,  myns  insiens, 
gedoog  te  word  slegs  waar  die  belangrikheid  van  die  teenbelang  wat  deur  die 
miskenning bevorder kan word vir dwingende redes so 'n afwyking regverdig. Die 
onderhawige is, myns insiens, nie so 'n geval nie, omdat dit nie moontlik is om 
vanuit die getuienis wat in die binneverhoor aangebied is die wesenlikheid van die 
items waarop beslag gelê is, in die vervolging van die beskuldigdes te bepaal nie. 
 
Although this decision was delivered prior to the enactment of  section 35(5), and 
despite the fact that the evidence in dispute was real evidence, its relevance is clear: 
the court considered "the importance of the evidence to secure a conviction". It also 
confirms the difficulty faced by the prosecution in presenting evidence, during a trial-
                                                           
116  S v Naidoo 1998 1 SACR 479 (D). See also S v Mphala 1998 1 SACR 388 (W) 400. 
117  S v Naidoo 1998 1 SACR 479 (D) 530. 
118  See Van der Merwe "Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence" (2002) 201; Steytler Constitutional 
Criminal Procedure 36. 
119  S v Mayekiso 1996 2 SACR 298 (C) 306. 
120  S v Mayekiso 1996  2 SACR 298 (C). 
121 S v Mayekiso 1996 2 SACR 298 (C) 307. Loosely translated, this passage has the following 
meaning: The Bill of Rights, contained in chapter 3 of the Constitution has been designed inter 
alia to protect the individual against the abuse of power by government institutions. The erosion 
of the rights  guaranteed in the  Bill of Rights ought, in my  view,  be permitted only  when  the 
limitation of those rights is justified by countervailing and pressing societal needs. The present 
case  is  not  such  a  case  because,  when  the  evidence  tendered  in  the  trial-within-a-trial  is 
considered, it is not possible to assess the significance of the seized items in the successful 
prosecution of the accused. (Own translation). D ALLY                                                                                           PER / PELJ 2012(15)5 
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within-a-trial, which may persuade a court that relevant evidence should be received 
in  the  face  of  a  constitutional  infringement,  because  it  is  important  to  secure  a 
conviction of the accused.  
 
The difficulty in making an assessment of the "importance of the evidence to secure 
a conviction" became obvious in the decisions of S v Shongwe
122 and the minority 
opinion in Pillay v S.
123 The Shongwe decision is briefly explored first, followed by a 
short discussion of the minority decision in Pillay. The accused in the Shongwe case 
faced  serious  charges.  The  accused  was  not  informed  about  the  right  to  legal 
representation, the right to remain silent, and the consequences of not remaining 
silent before he made a pointing-out and confessed to committing the crime.
124 While 
considering the admissibility of the disputed evidence,  the court was of the opinion 
that  "[a]s  'n  skuldige  persoon  in  hierdie  omstandighede  vry  uitgaan,  sal  dit 
teenproduktief wees vir die bevordering van menseregte ...".
125 This dictum might 
create  the  impression  among  reasonable,  objective  and  informed  persons  that 
factual  guilt  informed  or  significantly  influenced  the  outcome  of  the  admissibility 
assessment.  Such  an  approach  would be vulnerable  to  the  criticism  that  it  could 
make inroads into the presumption of innocence.  
 
In similar vein Scott JA, writing a minority opinion in Pillay v S,
126 made the following 
remark while assessing the "importance of the evidence to secure a conviction":
127 
 
                                                           
122 S v Shongwe 1998 9 BCLR 1170 (T). 
123 Pillay v S 2004 2 BCLR 158 (SCA). 
124 S v Shongwe 1998 2 SACR 321 (T) 334. 
125 S v Shongwe 1998 2 SACR 321 (T) 345. Loosely translated, this means that "it would be counter-
productive  for  the  advancement  of  a  culture  of  human  rights  if  a  guilty  person  were  to  be 
acquitted in these circumstances ..." (Own translation). See also S v Muravha 1998 JOL 3994 (V) 
16, where Preller AJ reasoned that the failure by the presiding magistrate to inform an accused 
of his right to remain silent, when there was a causal link between his confessional statement 
and the magistrate's failure to inform the accused about his rights, constitutes a "breach of a less 
serious nature". The judge reasoned that such a breach does not justify "the acquittal of a person 
who, in a hypothetical case, is clearly guilty of a serious offence". Compare Stuart 2010 Sw L Int'l 
L  318,  where  he  reasons  that:  "Ignorance  of  Charter  standards  must  not  be  rewarded  or 
encouraged and negligence and wilful [sic] blindness cannot be equated with good faith". In other 
words, the Muravha court over-emphasised the seriousness of the charge and the importance of 
the evidence, thus failing to attach sufficient importance to the seriousness of the infringement. 
126  Pillay v S 2004 2 BCLR 158 (SCA). 
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Whether the admission of the evidence and the resultant conviction of accused 10 
would be detrimental to the administration of justice involves,  I think, an inquiry 
whether an acquittal would be likely to bring about a loss of respect for the judicial 
process  in  the  eyes  of  reasonable  and  dispassionate  members  of  society  and, 
conversely, whether a conviction would be likely to result in a loss of respect for the 
Bill of Rights (emphasis added). 
 
This factor has been construed to entail that our courts must consider what effect 
either  the  admission  or  exclusion  of  the  disputed  evidence  would  have  on  the 
integrity of the criminal justice system. The concern with such an analysis is that, in 
order  to  give  effect  to  this  inquiry,  our  courts  must  consider  what  impact  their 
admissibility rulings (either admission or exclusion) would have on the outcomes (a 
conviction  or  an  acquittal)  in  the  cases  before  them.  Such  an  assessment  links 
admissibility to criminal culpability. Thus, if the issue of admissibility is closely tied to 
the criminal culpability of the accused, such an approach might be frowned upon by 
fundamental  rights  protagonists,  since  it  implicitly  promotes  the  erosion  of  the 
presumption  of  innocence.
128  Such  an  approach  implies  that  unconstitutionally 
obtained evidence should be readily admi tted in the event that the accused is 
adjudged to be factually guilty. Taken to its logical conclusion, evidence should 
regularly be excluded when the accused is likely to be acquitted.
129 Surely, this could 
not have been the purpose sought to be  advanced by section 35(5). If this were the 
case,  the  rationale  for  the  existence  of  the  constitutional  provision  would  be 
defeated. 
 
It is not suggested that the blame for this approach lay at the doorstep of the judge in 
the Shongwe decision and that of the minority opinion in Pillay. On the contrary, I 
would offer the opinion that this difficulty is intrinsically linked to the nature of the 
inquiry,  which  prompted  the  relevant  courts  to  consider  what  impact  an  acquittal 
would  have  on  the  integrity  of  the  criminal  justice  system  (when  the  accused  is 
factually guilty). The nature of the inquiry called upon the Shongwe court and the 
minority decision in Pillay to link the admissibility assessment to criminal culpability 
and, in so doing, possibly encroached upon the presumption of innocence. In my 
                                                           
128  Compare the approach followed in S v Melani 1996 2 BCLR 174 (EC) 353. See also Ntzweli v S 
2001 2 All SA 184 (C), where it was held that the "question of the factual guilt of the accused 
should not be considered in a trial-within-a-trial". 
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view  the  nature  of  the  inquiry  inevitably  leads  to  such  a  linkage,
130  because  an 
analysis  taking  into  account  "the  importance  of  the  evidence  for  a  conviction " 
necessarily concerns itself with the outcome of the case, in the sen se that  the 
exclusion of the disputed evidence, crucial for a conviction  on a serious charge, will 
more often than not have an adverse effect on the integrity of the criminal justice 
system if the accused is factually guilty.  
 
Conversely, the majority opinion (written by Mpati DP and Motata AJA)  in Pillay v 
S,
131 whilst acknowledging the concerns of Scott JA, placed great emphasis on the 
duty of the courts to protect the integrity of the criminal justice system.
132 On this 
basis the majority opinion concluded that the disputed evidence should be excluded 
so as to prevent judicial contamination.
133  The majority judgment in  Pillay  v  S
134 
placed a high premium on their function as protectors of constitutional rights, even 
though the social costs of exclusion in this case were great.
135 In my view society 
paid  a  significantly  high  premium  in  Pillay  v  S,
136  given  that  the  accused  was 
factually guilty
137 of a serious offence,
138 and the evidence that could in all probability 
have secured a conviction
139  was excluded.
140  Heeding the rationale of section 
                                                           
130  This  link  is  effectively  avoided  in  Canadian  admissibility  assessments,  because  admissibility 
challenges are dealt with during pre-trial motions before criminal culpability is assessed. 
131  Pillay v S 2004 2 BCLR 158 (SCA). 
132  Pillay v S 2004 2 BCLR 158 (SCA) para 97. 
133  Pillay v S 2004 2 BCLR 158 (SCA) para 97, where the judges reasoned as follows: "The police, 
in  behaving  as  they  did,  ie  charging  accused  10  in  spite  of  the  undertaking,  and  the  courts 
sanctioning such behaviour, the objective referred to will in future be  well nigh impossible to 
achieve".  
134  Pillay v S 2004 2 BCLR 158 (SCA). 
135  See also the following decisions where the social costs were high. In S v Tandwa 2007 SCA 34 
(RSA); S v Naidoo 1998 1 SACR 479 (D); S v Hena 2006 2 SACR 33 (SE); S v Motloutsi 1996 1 
SACR 78 (C) and S v Mphala 1998 1 SACR 388 (W), the accused were factually guilty of serious 
offences. Even so, the respective courts held that the unconstitutionally obtained evidence that 
firmly linked the individual accused persons to the crimes should be excluded. However, in S v 
Melani  1996  2  BCLR  174  (EC),  the  accused  was  convicted  regardless  of  the  fact  that  the 
unconstitutionally  obtained  confession,  obtained  following  a  violation  of  the  right  to  legal 
representation, had been excluded. The remainder of the admissible evidence persuaded the 
court of the criminal culpability of the accused. It can for this reason be argued that the social 
costs of exclusion were not high in the Melani decision, since the exclusion did not result in the 
acquittal of an accused who was factually guilty. 
136  Pillay v S 2004 2 BCLR 158 (SCA). 
137  Pillay v S 2004 2 BCLR 158 (SCA) para 97. 
138  Pillay v S 2004 2 BCLR 158 (SCA) para 71. 
139  Pillay v S 2004 2 BCLR 158 (SCA) para 97.  
140  Pillay v S 2004 2 BCLR 158 (SCA) para 98. For an analogous approach by the Supreme Court of 
Appeal, see S v Matlou 2010 2 SACR 342 (SCA) para 31. The accused in Matlou was assaulted 
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35(5),  the  majority  opinion  asserted  its  dissociation  with  the  unwarranted  police 
conduct as the ground for excluding reliable real evidence essential to securing the 
conviction  of  the  accused.
141  The  accused  was  consequently  acquitted.
142  This 
approach by the majority opinion is supported. 
 
The  inherent  weakness  of an approach that  adds factual guilt into the equation 
during the admissibility assessment  is pertinently demonstrated by the comments 
made by the full bench in S v Mkhize,
143 where Willis J wrote a unanimous judgment 
to  the  effect  that  the  provisions  of  the  Criminal  Procedure  Act  regarding  the 
obtainment of search warrants are not intended for:
144 
 
… the purpose of ensuring the fairness of a trial of an accused person but to protect 
the ordinary law-abiding citizens of our land from an abuse of the formidable powers 
which the police necessarily have.  
 
The court in S v Mkhize
145 conveyed an inapt message to those accused of having 
allegedly committed criminal offences: that they may not rely on the presumption of 
innocence. It also sent an improper message to law enforcement agencies, to the 
effect  that  the  goals  of  crime  control  justify  unwarranted  interference  with 
constitutional rights, that the end justifies the means, a sentiment reminiscent of the 
rationale of the common law inclusionary rule. The Mkhize judgment further implies 
that when the unconstitutional police conduct leads to the discovery of real evidence 
that  confirms  the  factual  guilt  of  the  accused,  such  evidence  could  be  admitted, 
regardless of the manner in which it had been obtained. Some might understandably 
argue that the court practically vindicated the unconstitutional search after the fact. 
The danger inherent in such an approach is that it might create the perception that 
our courts do not have a high regard for the constitutional rights guaranteed in the 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
right to legal representation and his right to remain silent were infringed. After a discoverability 
analysis the court held that the admission of the disputed evidence would not only render his trial 
unfair, but its admission would also be detrimental to the administration of justice. As a result, 
real evidence, essential for convictions on serious charges (and which linked the accused to 
such  charges)  was  excluded.  Compare  S  v  Lachman  2010  2  SACR  52  (SCA),  where  a 
discoverability analysis resulted in the admission of the disputed evidence. 
141  Pillay v S 2004 2 BCLR 158 (SCA) para 97. 
142  Pillay v S 2004 2 BCLR 158 (SCA) para 98. 
143  S v Mkhize 1999 2 SACR 632 (W); compare S v Melani 1996 2 BCLR 174 (EC) 353, where the 
presumption of innocence was duly considered.  
144  S v Mkhize 1999 2 SACR 632 (W) 637. (Emphasis added). 
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Bill of Rights. The Mkhize judgment seemingly failed to take into account that an 
admissibility  ruling  should  be  focussed  not  only  on  that  particular  case,  but  that 
courts should also consider what effect the regular admission of evidence obtained 
in such a manner would have on the integrity of the criminal justice system.
146 
 
To summarise, the  majority judgment in  Pillay  v  S
147  appropriately  conveys  the 
message that the costs of exclusion should not be determinative of the outcome of 
the  admissibility  assessment.  The  opposing  approach  implies  that  reliable  real 
evidence  essential  for  a  conviction  on  serious  charges  would  be  more  readily 
admitted. The admission of the disputed evidence under these circumstances would 
evidently  find  public  support,  especially  when  South  Africans  are  enduring  high 
levels of serious crime.
148 Such an approach is also strongly  associated with the 
common law inclusionary rule. It is submitted that section 35(5) implicitly overrules 
this common law practice.
149 
 
3  Conclusion 
 
The high rate of serious crime in South Africa should not be considered as a factor 
that unduly tilts the scales in favour of the admission of the disputed evidence. South 
African courts should be wary not to convey the message to society that the ends of 
crime control justify the use of unconstitutional means. Such an approach would be 
tantamount to informing members of society at large that their rights guaranteed in 
the Bill of Rights are not of any value for the reason that the high rate of serious 
crime in South Africa does not show any signs of decline.
150 This implies that South 
Africans should accept that what the Constitution guarantees should not be taken 
seriously.  
 
The "current mood" of society does matter in the section 35(5) assessment. This is 
common cause between both due process protagonists and those in favour of crime 
                                                           
146  R v Traverse 2003 Carswell Nfld 119 paras 34-36. 
147  Pillay v S 2004 2 BCLR 158 (SCA). 
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149  Stuart 2010 Sw J Int'l Law 318, citing R v Grant 2009 66 CR (6th) 1 (SCC) para 84. 
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control values. The differences emerge when one has to determine the weight that 
should be attached  to  the  "current mood" of  society.
151  Those in favour of crime 
control would suggest that the  "current mood" of society should feature prominently 
during the second phase of the admissibility inquiry. South African scholarly writers, 
like their Canadian c ounterparts,
152  are divided on this issue.
153  Likewise, South 
African decisions are incompatible with regard to the weight that should be attached 
to public opinion.
154 The guidance of the Constitutional Court on this important issue 
is awaited.  
 
Section 35(5)  enjoins South African courts not to be swayed by the pressures of 
public opinion but to assure all South Africans  – regardless of the fact that they are 
accused of having committed the most heinous crimes and no matter if the likelihood 
is great that they actually committed such crimes – that the goals of crime control do 
not justify unconstitutional police conduct. Instead, the goal of preserving the integrity 
of  the  criminal  justice  system  is  of  paramount  importance  in  section  35(5) 
challenges.
155 It is submitted that, while the "current public mood" of society may be 
a relevant consideration  in the admissibility assessment, it should not replace the 
fundamental duty of South African courts to "uphold and protect the Constitution and 
the human rights entrenched in it", and to administer justice to  "all persons alike 
without fear, favour or prejudice, in accordance with the Constitution and the law".
156 
 
The  presumption  of  innocence  deserves  particular  protection  in  a  constitutional 
democracy based on human dignity, freedom and equality, even when the evidence 
is  essential  to  convict  an  accused facing serious  charges.  For  this  reason the 
admissibility  inquiry  must  be  isolated  from  the  assessment  of  factual  guilt. 
                                                           
151  De Villiers 1997 TSAR 622; Schutte 2000 SACJ 67. 
152  Paciocco  1989  CLQ  340-345  argues  that  the  courts  should  seek  public  popularity.  Compare 
Roach Remedies 10-83 to 10-84, who is opposed to this view. 
153  Van der Merwe "Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence" (2002) 234; De Villiers 2008 TSAR 37; 
compare Steytler Constitutional Criminal Procedure 40, who is of the opinion that the long-term 
values of the Constitution should be a dominant feature.  
154  See for example S v Shongwe 1998 9 BCLR 1170 (T); S v Mkhize 1999 2 SACR 632 (W); S v 
Ncgobo 1998 10 BCLR 1248 (W); compare S v Melani 1996 2 BCLR 174 (EC); S v Nomwebu 
1996 2 SACR 396 (E); S v Soci 1998 2 SACR 275 (E). 
155  S v Mthembu 2008 ZASCA 51 para 33, where Cachalia JA, writing for a unanimous Supreme 
Court  of  Appeal,  confirmed  this  contention  in  the  following  terms:  "…  the  purpose  of  the 
exclusionary rule is to uphold the integrity of the administration of justice". 
156  The  oath  taken  by  judges  when  they  take  office,  contained  in  item  6  of  Schedule  2  of  the 
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Furthermore, the fact that the accused is factually guilty should not be determinative 
of the admissibility assessment. Contrary to the approach followed by the minority 
opinion in Pillay v S,
157 it is suggested that the admissibility issue should not, in order 
to protect the presumption of innocence, be closely linked to criminal culpability.
158 In 
my view the nature of the assessment seems to be the reason why this approach 
was followed by the minority opinion in the Pillay decision.  
 
In the light hereof it is suggested that our courts should rather focus on the "reliability 
of the evidence" (or the nature of the evidence) and the seriousness of the charge 
faced by the accused when assessing the third group of factors. This does not mean 
that the factor of the "importance of the evidence to secure a conviction" should be 
totally disregarded. The reliability of the evidence is a key factor when determining 
the importance of the evidence for a successful prosecution. Cromwell J explained 
why this is the case, in R v Côté, when he reasoned that when a conviction is based 
on  unreliable  evidence,  the  admission  of  such  evidence  would  bring  the 
administration of justice into disrepute; by contrast, the exclusion of reliable evidence 
may impact negatively on the truth-seeking role of the criminal justice system when 
such an exclusion destroys the prosecution's case.
159 From this point of view, the 
assessment of the importance of the evidence for the prosecution hinges on the 
reliability of the evidence. 
 
It  is  further  suggested   that  the  reliability  of  the  evidence   should  be  a  key 
consideration  (among  others)  under the  third  group  of factors  for the  following 
reasons.
160 First, the assessment of the suggested factor will overcome the difficulty 
(as argued above) experienced by our courts when they assess the "importance of 
the evidence for a conviction". In other words, the implicit erosion of the presumption 
of innocence will be avoided. Secondly, the suggested refocusing on the reliability of 
the evidence is not at odds with an assessment of the public interest in crime control 
                                                           
157  Pillay v S 2004 2 BCLR 158 (SCA) para 133. 
158  See Ntzweli v S 2001 2 All SA 184 (C) 188. 
159  R v Côté 2011 SCC 46 para 47. 
160  While bearing in mind the observation by Stuart 2010 Sw J Int'l L 326, that, although the reliability 
of  evidence  and  whether  or  not  it  is  essential  for  a  successful  prosecution  are  relevant 
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and the integrity of the criminal justice system. In contrast, such interests are placed 
within their proper context when the reliability of the evidence is considered a key 
factor.  Thirdly,  the  suggested  focus  on  the  reliability  of  the  evidence  will,  from  a 
purely pragmatic point of view, markedly decrease the difficulty experienced by the 
prosecution  when  presenting  evidence  about  the  costs  of  exclusion.  Finally,  an 
assessment of the reliability of the evidence is strongly aligned to the values which 
section 35(5) seeks to enhance, since the admission of unreliable evidence in order 
to secure a conviction on a serious charge would unquestionably be detrimental to 
the  administration  of  justice
161  and  would  also  impact negatively on the societal 
interest in ensuring that an accused should not be subjected to an unfair trial.
162 
 
The seriousness of the charge faced by an accused is one of the important factors 
that must be considered in admissibility challenges, but it should not be allowed to 
overshadow the other factors that a court has to weigh and balance in admissibility 
challenges. It cannot be denied that society has a heightened interest in ensuring 
that those who face serious charges (and who are factually guilty) be convicted . 
Likewise,  it  cannot  be  disputed  that  society  has  a  corresponding  concern  in 
safeguarding the constitutional rights of those accused of having allegedly committed 
the most atrocious crimes. In the light hereof it would be appropriate to assess the 
seriousness of the charges faced by the accused while having due regard to the duty 
of the courts to defend the integrity of the justice system.
163 
 
So, should factual guilt tip the scales in favour of the admission of unconstitutionally 
obtained evidence  when such evidence is   crucial  for  a conviction on a serious 
charge? The review of our section 35(5) jurisprudence has revealed that,  by and 
large, the courts of South Africa have demonstrated firm resistance against the 
philosophy that suggests that the costs of exclusion should have a n effect on their 
                                                           
161  Hogg Constitutional Law 937 expresses a similar opinion when he explores the first leg of the 
admissibility assessment. 
162  R v Côté 2011 SCC 46 para 47, where Cromwell J reasoned as follows: "Admitting unreliable 
evidence will not serve the accused's fair trial interests nor the public's desire to uncover the 
truth." 
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admissibility  rulings.
164  Evidence  crucial  for  successful  prosecutions  on  serious 
charges has in a number of cases been excluded in order to  achieve the goal of 
preventing judicial contamination, while also complying with the directive of section 
35(5), that is,  the  prevention  of disrepute befalling  the administration of criminal 
justice.
165  This seems to be the correct approach, since t he regular excuse of 
unconstitutional police conduct because the evidence is essential for a conviction on 
serious  charges  would  only  revive  the  public  perception  (which  existed  before 
1994)
166 that the police are above the law.
167  
 
Such public perceptions may be detrimental to the  integrity of the criminal justice 
system. To be sure, the regular admission of evidence obtained in blatant disregard 
of  constitutional rights,  which  evidence  is important for  a conviction on serious 
charges, runs counter to two important principles:  first, the "never again" principle, 
which was endorsed by the Constitutional Court as one of the fundamental tools that 
should be employed to interpret the provisions of the Bill of Rights ;
168 and secondly, 
the directive of section 35(5) that in challenges under section 35(5) our courts must 
defend the integrity of the criminal justice system. 
                                                           
164  See for example S v Motloutsi 1996 1 SACR 78 (C) and S v Mphala 1998 1 SACR 388 (W); S v 
Naidoo 1998 1 SACR 479 (D); S v Hena 2006 2 SACR 33 (SE); the majority opinion in Pillay v S 
2004 2 BCLR 158 (SCA); S v Tandwa 2007 SCA 34 (RSA); S v Mthembu 2008 ZASCA 51; S v 
Matlou 2010 2 SACR 342.  
165  See the cases cited in the note immediately above. 
166  See the comments by McCall J in S v Naidoo 1998 1 SACR 479 (D) 531. 
167  See De Villiers (ed) TRC Report 31. 
168  Ferreira v Levine; Vryenhoek v Powell 1996 1 SA 984 (CC) para 257, fn 22 of the separate but 
concurring judgment delivered by Sachs J. D ALLY                                                                                           PER / PELJ 2012(15)5 
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